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‘Knowing’, absence and presence: the spatial and temporal depth of relations 
 
Abstract 
Through the lens of ‘knowing’, which is simultaneously an expression in colloquial English 
and a set of cognate practices, this article considers the ways in which relations come to 
have ontological depth which is both spatial and temporal. The significance of ‘knowing’ 
people and places in everyday life exceeds a simple ‘familiarity with’ or ‘knowledge of’. 
Instead, ‘knowing’ speaks to what it is that is said to matter in the webs of relations which 
connect (and sometimes disconnect) people and place, connections that accumulate in 
uneven and unequal ways. The article thus builds on recent literature in human geography 
on absence, presence and post-industrial ruins and weds it with anthropological theory on 
connectedness, relatedness and ruination to examine ‘knowing’. This cross-fertilization of 
disciplinary perspectives permits me to pay critical attention to seemingly incommensurate 
and yet overlapping webs of relations (relations with people alive and dead, relations with 
places present and absent, relations with memory, relations with change and the past). 
Following Navaro-Yashin’s recent work in Northern Cyprus (2009), I argue that ‘knowing’ in 
regards to absence sheds light on the theoretical bind of object- versus subject-centred 
approaches.  
 
Keywords: absent presences, knowing, relatedness, affect, subjectivity 
 
Introduction 
This article examines the depth of feeling forged between people through place and time. I 
focus on the processes by which people, places and objects become “mutually possessive” 
(Candea 2010:127) or, in other words, the ways in which they become interconnected, as 
well as the temporal and spatial dynamics of these processes. The ethnographic locale 
where I conducted the research motivating this piece however is one where erasure and 
absence inform social relations as much as presence and continuity do. What, then, are the 
consequences of mutual possession in such an ethnographic context where people, places 
and objects occupying seemingly incommensurate domains of the living and the dead, the 
present and the erased, the visible and the eradicated? These domain crossings are 
premised on cultural logics that, as I will argue here, can contribute to larger debates over 
subjectivity and affect. I shall be arguing that ‘knowing’ people and places, and ‘being 
known’, is a relational aspect whereby people can be connected (as well as disconnected) to 
each other through place (Ingold 2011) and through social memory. Dodworth, the village 
where this fieldwork was based, is a setting of intense localism. Social interaction and public 
discourse here are characterised by the regular exchange of stories about shared historical 
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experiences and of the micro-details about individual villager’s biographies as well as those 
of their wider family networks. ‘Knowing’ thus reveals a set of practices of how people 
position themselves in multiple ways within overlapping webs of relations: relations with 
people, relations with places, relations with memory, relations with change and in relation 
with the past. 
While a growing literature in human geography on ‘absent presences’ (Crewe 2011, 
Hetherington 2004, Mansvelt 2010) and on the ties between place, memory, ruins and affect 
(Edensor 2005a, 2005b) is a useful starting point for the analysis of such processes, so too 
are recent developments in anthropology that grapple with connection and relatedness 
(Edwards 2000) and ruination (Navaro-Yashin 2009). Respective disciplinary perspectives on 
these related issues however are not often brought into conversation, even though much 
might be achieved by opening up such a dialogue. This article thus draws from recent work 
in human geography and social anthropology in order to examine in closer detail the spatial 
and temporal processes by which the intersection of people, places and objects come to 
matter. As my work shows, and in counter-distinction to the existent literature in geography 
on absent presences, these are relations not premised on consumption, disposal or 
anonymity, nor do they set up an opposition between affect on the one hand and 
subjectivity on the other. Following Navaro-Yashin, I shall be arguing for a perspective on the 
mutual possession of people, place and memory that can attend to both affect and 
subjectivity. Such a framing permits a fuller understanding of the ways in which relations 
come to have ontological depth which is both spatial and temporal. It also sheds critical light 
on a theoretical bind of the dilemma of choosing between an object- or a subject-centred 
perspective and what can be learned from ruination about the imbrication of affect and 
subjectivity (Navaro-Yashin 2009). Conversely, whilst the ‘affective turn’ has gained 
momentum in human geography and other cognate disciplines, it has not received the same 
attention in anthropological theory. This has instead arguably been more concerned with an 
emergent ontological turn as well as a long-standing focus on otherness and alterity (see 
Alberti et al 2011; Carrithers et al 2010; Fontein 2011). Placing these disciplinary 
preoccupations into direct conversation proves useful for developing both. 
Based on long-term ethnographic fieldwork in the north of England and in a South 
Yorkshire village called Dodworth, near Barnsley, my entrée point into these issues is via 
‘knowing’. ‘Knowing’ is both a colloquial English expression and a set of cognate practices.  
‘Knowing’ is used to refer to places (both present and erased) and to people (both alive and 
dead). It can also evoke an individual ‘being known’ to others or by others. However, as I 
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shall demonstrate, ‘knowing’ is about more than a familiarity with, information acquired or 
social networks as might be commonly assumed. This is because ‘knowing’ is often evoked 
by people when seeking to explain what it is that matters in the webs of relations binding 
them to others and to where they live. Indeed, it is often an accrued depth of feeling over 
time that is connoted in its use. It is for these reasons that I argue ‘knowing’ speaks to the 
constitution of self and belonging through the tightly woven skeins of social memory, social 
connections, time and place.  
Examining these issues in a small, seemingly unremarkable English village may strike 
some readers as counterintuitive. Cities and iconic landscapes might spring first to mind as a 
more likely setting. However, to my mind, it is precisely the unspectacular and everyday 
post-industrial realities playing out across under-represented sites both in Britain and 
globally that equally demand of us critical attention. My account of Dodworth thus serves as 
a corrective balance to the existing literature, but also as a reminder that occurrences and 
experiences in small village locations can contribute just as profoundly to our 
understandings of the world as does material from supposedly grander locales.  
To assist me in exploring the significance of ‘knowing’, I first recount an episode 
from my ethnographic fieldwork that helps to better contextualise ‘knowing’ in the sense 
that I use it here. I then consider recent work in human geography on absent presences in 
juxtaposition with anthropological perspectives on the making of people and the making of 
relations between them (Edwards 2000) in conversation with my ethnographic data in order 
to detail the ways in which absence, anonymity, connection and presence become useful 
analytical perspectives for making sense of  ‘knowing’. 
 
The ‘Art’ of knowing 
One February morning, I went to visit Art at home. At the time I knew him, he was 73 years 
old and had within the past few years moved into a bungalow in Dodworth, having lived his 
entire life in the Barnsley area. Over the four hours that I spent visiting with him that day, 
we spoke of many things. Art was a wealth of local information and loved sharing his 
knowledge of the area. Local landmarks, past and present, were one of his fortes. Sitting 
together in his living room, he would often narrate us around the area, telling me what had 
been where and what was there now:  
 
You know that big roundabout where Asda1 is? Well that used to be a paper mill. 
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Redfern’s, the big glass works, that used to be where Halford’s2 is now, just on the 
other side of the roundabout from Asda’s as you go up that big hill. 
 
And do you know West Green? Well, it was called ‘Klondike’ because of the black gold 
of its coal… 
 
Art’s stories about the Barnsley he knew were peppered with memories of places erased 
and rebuilt upon, of sites where things used to happen differently than they do now and 
how things used to look compared to how they now appear. 
In addition, we also talked about micro-locales, belonging and disenfranchisement. 
Art had always lived in the Barnsley area and had grown up about three miles from 
Dodworth. Despite this, when we started talking that afternoon about his life since he had 
moved to Dodworth he told me: “I’m a foreigner, an outcast here”. In so saying, he was 
referring to his own sense of disconnection, but one that I had also heard from others, all of 
whom had moved into Dodworth after retirement to live in the council-owned bungalows 
there. Like Art, although they had lived their lives in the greater Barnsley area, they had not 
grown up in Dodworth. Some had described this experience to me as feeling like they 
“needed a passport” to move into Dodworth and their experiences were in great contrast to 
the profound sense of belonging to and being of Dodworth expressed by “old Dodworthers” 
who had been born and or raised in the village3. Despite feeling like a foreigner in Dodworth, 
Art was a regular at the community centres there. He had made a life for himself in 
Dodworth and was well liked. Furthermore, Art’s working life meant that he was well 
connected. He had started work in the coal industry, working at Barnsley Main and then 
Monk Bretton pit from the age of 14. When he turned 21, he left mining and went to work 
for the Yorkshire Traction bus company, first as a conductor and then as a driver for the rest 
of his working life. He pointed out to me that since he had been a Barnsley area bus driver 
for so many years, he still often recognises people from his bus routes and they him. He 
quickly qualified this by saying that since he does not drink at the working men’s club in 
Dodworth, he has “not really gotten to know people that well”.  
I was surprised by this claim. Although I was aware that Art felt like an outsider since 
he had not grown up in Dodworth, I had witnessed on many occasions his easy, relaxed 
manner in the community spaces for older people in Dodworth that he socialised in. It 
seemed that he knew people in these groups very well and they him. So, I asked him who he 
does ‘know’? He replied that he goes to the former working men’s club nearest to the 
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Yorkshire Traction depot (and thus a social site that would have been a regular feature of his 
working life) from time to time and “knows everybody” there. But, he continued, not too 
long ago he had been walking into a department store in Barnsley town centre. He saw a 
man he recognised, but could not place him right away. The man recognised him too and 
exclaimed “Art Lowe!” out loud. Suddenly, Art realised that it was Henry Moss who he had 
gone to school with and who he had not seen since. So pleased were they to see each other 
that they immediately went and had a coffee together in order to catch up. Art then 
elaborated by telling me that “it’s funny how you know people better from forty or fifty 
years ago, even if you haven’t seen them in years and years and years, than people you’ve 
met more recently”. 
Art is by no means alone in the ways in which he uses ‘knowing’. It is a phrase that 
caught my attention many times during my fieldwork as the ways in which it is used holds a 
particular weight that exceeded my own previous connotations of the word. ‘Knowing’ 
means more than information learnt or an acknowledgement of prior relationships, or even 
a passing familiarity. Instead, it connotes something shared, temporally laden and to do with 
experience, emotion, place and the past, sociability, working lives, place of birth and place of 
residence. This article draws on material collected in 2000-2001 and 2003-2004 during two 
periods of ethnographic fieldwork totalling 26 months in Dodworth. During this time, I 
conducted participant observation fieldwork, wrote extensive fieldnote diaries and 
conducted 63 in-depth semi-structured interviews for two different projects4. Dodworth is a 
village of approximately 5,000 people that used to have coal mines in an area that used to 
be known for coal mining. Dodworth, and many other former industrial villages in South 
Yorkshire, is distinguished from similarly neglected post-industrial urban areas by high rates 
of mono-ethnic and mono-racial profiles in a way that accentuates differences with 
ostensibly similar neighbourhoods in former industrial cities5.  
Up until the late 1980s, coal was still being mined on a large scale in and around 
Dodworth. Not everyone in Dodworth worked in the coal industry and not everyone in my 
research population was directly affected by the demise of mining. However, the closure of 
the pits signals a central moment in the village’s history with the disappearance of this major 
source of employment and identity transforming Dodworth beyond recognition on both 
experiential and practical levels. Within a decade, the area went from being modestly 
prosperous to being labelled one of the “most deprived” areas of Europe (Barnsley Chronicle 
2002). In Dodworth, ‘knowing’ intersects with great social stakes of rupture, transformation, 
erasure, absence, belonging and exclusion that are playing out in this a post-industrial locale 
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with its own distinctive socio-historical contours in the semi-rural coal fields of northern 
England. In order to more fully consider the implications of this, I turn now to relevant 
literature on absence and presence.  
 
Absent presences 
An emergent and growing body of literature on absent presences in human geography is 
tied to debates over consumption, such as its spatialised politics (Mansvelt 2010); the 
haunting traces of former possessions which never entirely disappear (Crewe 2011); and a 
conceptual focus on the temporal, spatial and social dynamics of disposal (Hetherington 
2004). Contemplating the possible discard of a household item can reveal the ways in which 
some objects come to “hold memories of relationships, encounters, and attachments”, 
rendering them exceedingly difficult to dispose of (Crewe 2011:37). This highlights the ways 
in which possessions become a “key component in the making of subjectivity…things rarely 
hold value in themselves as objects but act as material memory joggers to an emotional 
state of moment that their owners want to recapture” (Crewe 2011:44). Subjective states 
and memories are thus not simply internal processes. Rather, they extend outward into the 
material environment, becoming lodged in objects and bound in a temporal flux of past, 
present and future whereby past events and their emotional tenor can be brought forward 
in time via encounters with the object.  
It is however more broadly what Hetherington identifies as the salience of the 
absent for social science inquiry, and not only what is present, that is central to my purposes 
here. Moving beyond the dilemmas of consumption, disposal and material objects, 
Hetherington is attuned to the ways in which “the absent can have just as much of an effect 
upon relations as recognizable forms of presence can…Social relations are performed not 
only around what is there but sometimes also around the presence of what is not” 
(Hetherington 2004:159; emphasis in original). The salience of the absent and the enduring 
presence of that which is now erased, knocked down and built over is evident in Art’s 
account. He speaks of a post-industrial landscape where sites of labour and mass 
employment at a paper mill, glassworks and coal mines are absences keenly felt on multiple 
levels of social life: employment, work-based identity, gendered relations and sociability. 
Art’s reflections on knowing places now absent and people seldom seen push me to extend 
Hetherington’s insights on the salience of the absent, but to shift the focus away from 
consumption and objects to turn it instead towards a consideration of possession, social 
transformation and social memory practices. That is to say, the idiom of  ‘knowing’ 
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demonstrates the ways in which relatedness between people and place are forged, 
disrupted and challenged due, in part, to absent presences. In this case, absence is not due 
to intentional practices of consumption and disposal, but rather absence at varying levels of 
scale. These include ruptures in the social fabric due to disrupted access to previous 
channels of social interaction and sources of meaning (at work, at the club, in the 
neighbourhood), but also in the local landscape due to significant post-industrial 
transformation.  
Refocusing critical attention on absent presences away from consumption and 
instead towards ‘knowing’ points to the ways in which absences are traced, evoked and used 
in contemporary Dodworth to help navigate one’s way through both social relations and the 
physical landscape. A temporally rich form of local discourse, ‘knowing’ emphasizes 
relationships, locales, encounters and attachments of people and places (both present and 
absent) in both the current day and in the past. Referencing one often necessitates 
referencing another. For example, in normal conversation, attempts to describe who 
someone was hinged critically on where they lived in the village (in the past or now in the 
current day) and descriptions of places and buildings (often no longer in existence or in a 
transformed state) in the village. This is wide-ranging but includes things like where the 
various corner shops (now defunct) used to be located in the village; who used to run them 
and who they are related to; who the local bookie used to be; where farms, abattoirs, pits, 
bus stops, paths and personal homes used to be; and the personality characteristics of 
specific individuals. These are neither fixed nor homogenous memories but rather 
fragmentary and at times contentious. Such knowledge accrues over long periods of time in 
various circumstances, contributes to a sense of self and belonging for those who are able to 
engage meaningfully in it and entails knowledge of an extensive vocabulary of collective and 
individual histories bound up in the micro-locale.  
Edensor’s (2005a, 2005b) work on memory, affect and the unruly disordered 
spatiality of post-industrial ruins is instructive in respect to ‘knowing’. He writes powerfully 
against the regulatory regimes of heritage industries that demarcate some locales, practices, 
objects and people as valid sites of official memory and others which are coded as irrelevant 
and in turn become “incinerated, dumped, or buried” (2005a:831). Edensor argues that 
official versions of the past are sanitized versions of the past, erasing the multiplicity and 
contradictions of what transpired there with linear accounts and essentialised forms of 
identity (2005a:832). He turns his analytical lens instead to post-industrial ruins “now 
bypassed by the flows of money, energy, people, and traffic within which they were once 
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enfolded. Ruins are sites…where the supposedly over-and-done-with remains” (2005a:829), 
sites where disposal and settlement remain as unfinished business (Hetherington 2004). 
Edensor seeks to bring ruins out of the shadows, foregrounding that which is more usually 
screened out, attending to the sensations and fragmentary memories that industrial ruins 
evoke. In so doing, he emphasizes the spectral, the immediacy of the sensual, but also the 
anonymity of previous inhabitants of these spaces. Despite the overwhelming traces of their 
presence (including abandoned items of work-place clothing like boilersuits and gloves, tools 
and office furniture evidencing regular use, graffiti that names individuals and incidents), in 
Edensor’s account these belong to unknown, unidentifiable, spectral bodies of the past that 
become generalized into ‘the ghosts’ of industrial ruins. Edensor’s work importantly 
challenges ordered notions of social remembering by refocusing attention on the 
contingent, the overlooked and the ways in which “memory is…not always articulate but is 
located in the habitual and the sensual” (2005a:846), highlighting “the mystery and radical 
otherness of the past” (2005a:847) rather than being content with sanitized and fixed official 
versions of memory.  
Without losing an alertness to these points, I am at the same time troubled by these 
spectral, anonymous, former inhabitants in light of ‘knowing’ in Dodworth. ‘Knowing’, also 
an unofficial and thus arguably debased form of social memory, contests this anonymity of 
people and places in Edensor’s account. Consider, for example, the work of shared proximity 
and spatial narratives in Dodworth in regards to ‘knowing’. The phrase “we went to school 
together” was often evoked by the people met there as a short hand for ‘knowing’ people, 
as Art does with Henry Moss above. However, while shared school days can be evoked as an 
important component of ‘knowing’, they are by no means a sufficient route to all ‘knowing’. 
Flo, a widow in her 80s who had lived in Dodworth her entire life, gave an excellent example 
of this one day when we were chatting together in her living room. She recounted to me 
that her neighbour, Elsie: 
 
...has home help6. Heh! (Flo laughs). Her that she has, I’ve not seen her, but Elsie was 
telling me, she says, ‘My home help knows you’. So I says ‘What do they call her?’ and 
she says ‘Grace Fisher’ and I says ‘Oh! She were a kid when I lived on Snow Hill’. I knew 
her mother you see, I knew her family and so she knew me from that, like. 
 
In this example, despite not meeting up face to face with the woman in question, Flo hears 
through the grapevine that she is ‘known’ to the home help of her neighbour, a discovery 
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significant enough that it warrants mention by Elsie to Flo and in turn from Flo to me. Flo 
contextualises her own ‘knowing’ of the home help via the woman’s family name (‘Grace 
Fisher’), kinship relations (‘her mother’, ‘her family’) and former place of residence that they 
shared (‘Snow Hill’, a place-name for a specific part of Dodworth). In this respect, ‘knowing’ 
is different to a familiar discourse that people often use to describe the recent past when 
“everyone knew everyone”. People in Dodworth do use expressions like this to evoke a 
somewhat rose-tinted past, but it is different to the ‘knowing’ that I am describing here. 
‘Knowing’ is not a generalised, communal sense of how things used to be that is evoked by 
the phrase “everyone knew everyone”. ‘Knowing’ is instead much more specific and located. 
It connects named individuals, specific village locales and various kinds of relationships 
(neighbours, friends, kin). This example further demonstrates how entitlement to claims of 
‘knowing’ builds up over time, incrementally, through neighbouring, shared residential 
proximity and a ready familiarity with one another’s relations and biographies. In contrast to 
Edensor’s account, ‘knowing’ is the very opposite of anonymous; it insists on presencing 
(rendering present) in the face of change and absence.  
On the one hand, this is perhaps not surprising. That belonging, self and identity are 
partly fashioned in relationship with place is a long established assertion across geography 
and anthropology (Basso 1996; Blokland 2001; Casey 1993; Feld, Basso 1996; Hirsch, 
O'Hanlon 1995; Massey 1994; Relph 1976; Rodman 1992; Rose 1995; Tuan 1977). However, 
‘knowing’ develops this by emphatically calling attention to the ways in which absence and 
temporality figure in the interstices of identity, self and place. Talk of ‘knowing’ in Dodworth 
evokes shared experiences of both the ‘then’ and the ‘now’ that accrues over time. 
‘Knowing’ is anchored in spatial, temporal and social registers of daily life. By examining 
‘knowing’ in Dodworth I am, like Mah (2010), interested in broadening discussions on post-
industrial settings in order to more fully consider how such transformations are lived by 
people who must make sense of the ruptures that “an uneven geography of capitalist 
development … (and) capital abandonment of sites of industrial production” (2010:399) 
leaves in its wake, given the particular rupturing conditions that post-industrial shifts have 
caused in South Yorkshire. ‘Knowing’ takes on a particular urgency in these conditions. But 
simultaneously, the cultural logic of ‘knowing’ also demands consideration: how is it that 
talk of places and people known, and the sense of connection and belonging that this 
permits (for some), can be based on such a wide spectrum of domains that range from sites 
of former workplaces, to intergenerational friendship networks, to kin relations? Social 
anthropology offers insight into this supposed dilemma, to which I now turn. 
 10 
 
 
Incommensurate domains, connections and distinctiveness 
 
As I have been arguing, ‘knowing’ brings multiple registers of social experience and social 
memories together in a complex temporal and spatial nexus that create a sense of 
connection to people and place. These include memories of individual people, extended kin 
networks, places of habitation, sites of work, of recreation and of mundane routines from a 
wide temporal spectrum that include people still alive and those now dead, sites still 
physically present as well as others which are now erased from the landscape but still 
powerfully mobilised in everyday talk. In these ways, ‘knowing’ brings together domains 
which are seemingly incommensurate.  
Domain crossings such as these have been termed “merographic” by Strathern 
(1992:72-81), signifying “cultural borrowing involved in the way ideas travel, connect, 
disconnect and contain one another” (Franklin 2003:66) whereby “the logic of the totality is 
not necessarily to be found in the logic of the parts, but in principles, forces, relations that 
exist beyond the parts” (Strathern 1992:76). Drawing inspiration from both Strathern and 
from Edwards (2000), I am interested here in the ways in which ‘knowing’ reveal such 
merographic connections and cultural borrowings. Whilst talk of demolished industrial sites, 
senses of belonging (or not), kinship networks, people now deceased and local places may 
indeed appear incommensurate, “connections across these domains can be made because 
each draws on similar cultural ideas” (Edwards 2000:242) about how people become 
meaningful and become connected to the world they live in. It is thus highly significant (and 
not accidental) that ‘knowing’ should be used to describe all of these connections as they 
overlap conceptually.  
Indeed, ‘knowing’ is an idiom that is not limited to Dodworth. It has appeared in other 
ethnographic accounts, such as Edwards’ anthropological work on relatedness and kinship in 
Bacup, in the northwest of England (2000)7. As in Dodworth, practices of ‘knowing’ in Bacup 
forge links and trace meaningful strands tying people to people and people to places. For 
example, Edwards describes how people ‘knew’ things about the Victorian back-to-back 
house needing renovation that she bought as a newcomer in Bacup. These things were 
mercilessly pointed them out to her time and again:  according to local opinion, installing a 
damp-proof course was downright senseless and putting in a window was too as ‘everybody 
knew’ that the particular house she had bought had dry-rot and had always suffered from 
damp. Furthermore, she was told,  
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there were good houses and bad houses, and nothing could be done…to make a 
bad house good.  ‘Belonging’ to Bacup meant ‘knowing’ about the place which 
includes its houses…[E]xpertise is a corollary of belonging, be it to places or 
persons (2000:7).  
 
Both my work in Dodworth and Edwards’ work in Bacup attests to the ways in which 
connections caught up in belonging and in ‘knowing’ are not only connections between 
people, but to places such as houses, factories and pubs (Edwards 2000:18) and pasts, 
through time. My work in Dodworth extends these insights to people and places both 
present and absent.  
Edwards’ wider work in Bacup is grounded in a concern with connection and 
distinctiveness. She has made a substantial contribution to anthropological debates on 
identity, moving beyond a primary analytical focus on identity categories (national, ethnic, 
class, cultural) and whether identity is made through difference and boundaries, to an 
analytical framework based on connections and attachments (Candea 2010:123-4). Unlike 
other authors promoting hybrid or fluid identities, she argues that belonging: 
 
does not primarily refer an individual to a category of identity confronted to 
another (an Other) category, but rather connects a person to other entities, 
human and non-human (persons, places, pasts, behaviours, etc.) People 
belong to places, to stories and to other people (who by the same token 
belong to them) before they belong to a category (Candea 2010:124; emphasis 
in original).  
 
Candea, drawing from his own anthropological research in Corsica where ‘knowing’ 
(connaître) was also a local concern, goes on to elaborate the ways in which ‘knowing’ can 
be said to be “an activity of proliferating connection”, one that highlights processes of 
“mutual possession – the interrelationship of people, places and stories into durable 
assemblages” (2010:127), processes that resonate strongly in both Dodworth and Bacup. 
Anthropological perspectives on the cultural logic of merographic connections and 
mutual possession whereby a sense of belonging and channels of social meaning are 
established and reproduced via the relations that exceed individual components (houses, 
people, places) and in turn are brought together in discourses and practices of ‘knowing’ 
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shed light on what is at stake in the lived experience of place. This is because unlike in 
Edensor’s account, it is the very process of knowing whereby the meaning and significance 
of place for belonging and relatedness emerge in a ‘world alive’ (Ingold 2011). These are 
lived worlds where entanglements of people, places, objects and memories, absences and 
deaths are crucially anything but anonymous. People and places are known despite their 
absence and erasure; these domains are brought together in ways that generate connection. 
Critical analysis of ‘knowing’ thus reveals how claims to belonging are predicated on 
culturally framed processes in which some domains of everyday life come to be meaningfully 
connected even though these domains may well appear incommensurate. 
However, as much as ‘knowing’ in these various sites is about tracing meaningful 
strands that tie people to people and to places,  ‘knowing’ is not an endless source of 
connection. The ‘knowing’ of people and places can also expose the limits of these 
connections. While ‘knowing’ can highlight connection, it can also cut and disconnect, for a 
relation in one direction instantiates a disconnection in another (Strathern 2005:7). For 
example, whilst both Art and Flo experience delight in their accounts of Henry Moss and 
Grace, ‘knowing’ is not universally described as positive. Consider Phyllis, now a widow in 
her 80s, who had grown up in a neighbouring village but had moved to Dodworth when she 
married Bill, a Dodworth man. Housing stock was limited: overcrowding was such a problem 
that in 1933 when twenty-six new council houses became available, 321 applicants 
competed for them (Hamby and Wyatt 1997:92).  Less than ten years later, when Phyllis and 
Bill were newlyweds, it was still difficult to procure a place to live. The couple lived with Bill’s 
parents for six years in a small terrace house and then with a family friend for another 
period of time before obtaining their own rented house. Phyllis recounted to me how even 
though Bill “was a bred and born Dodworther” she had to go “all over [searching] for 
houses: pit houses, other houses, council houses. Because I’d no family [i.e. no children], 
they said we didn’t come into it.” They would have loved kids, she said, “but never had a 
sign of them”. Bill and Phyllis were married in 1942 and three years later Dodworth council 
began an extensive building programme of council houses. But in order to obtain a council 
house, one dealt directly with councillors. As Phyllis reminded me: 
 
You see then love, with council, there were Dodworth councillors, you know, its 
not like going into Barnsley nowadays. And I mean, they knew him (Bill) and well 
one fella said ‘well you’ve no family so you’re not in need of one’. 
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Until 1976 when the local council became amalgamated into the Barnsley Metropolitan 
Borough Council (and local government powers were relocated to the neighbouring town of 
Barnsley), Dodworth, I was told many times, “was for Dodworthers”. Prior to this, Dodworth 
had its own council and was run by local councillors. Localness was much more immediately 
local in this era and individuals were less anonymous – Bill knew the councillor and the 
councillor knew him and his family circumstances – and this knowledge was used in decision 
making, such as who had priority for houses. As such, ‘knowing’ can also mean social 
leverage, have implications for shared resources and eligibility that works both for and 
against people living in areas shaped by the density of overlapping networks8 such as family, 
local government, work life and neighbours,  both historically and in the present day. 
Similarly, during my fieldwork 60 years after the events recounted by Phyllis, 
anonymity in Dodworth often felt impossible: this is still a relatively small village with 
complicated and long-standing webs of relations. On many occasions, I was to find that my 
whereabouts and movements became nodes of information circulating throughout the 
village. I would go somewhere or meet someone only to discover later that other people 
unconnected to the event would have learned about what I had been doing, either because 
they saw me walking in a particular direction and assumed I was going to visit so and so or 
because they had heard through the grapevine about my activities. The boundaries between 
what were ‘private’ movements and interactions and those which became publically 
‘known’, discussed and shared were often indistinct.  
At first, I found this highly disconcerting. I explained away to myself the communal 
interest in my actions as attributable to my fairly unusual role as recently arrived 
anthropologist. I started making conscious decisions about how I would travel between 
destinations in the village to avoid being seen, as it was seemingly just me that was subject 
of the scrutiny. But then, some people I visited regularly began encouraging me to adopt 
similar strategies, teaching me how they did it themselves. Such tactics applied both to the 
present day and the historical past. Ida, for example, would always invite me to leave by her 
back door and use the alleyway as a short cut to my house from hers. This ensured that I 
would not walk by the homes of other people we both socialised with and that I would avoid 
being seen. She would also always give me carrier bags to carry home things she had given 
me. This was so “no-one’ll know your business” - they would not be able to see what I was 
carrying - or her “business”, since no one could see what she had given me.  
Another woman told me how she used to avoid her mother-in-law’s prying eyes in the late 
1940s by going one way round the village rather than another. The same woman taught me 
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how to travel from my house to her’s and limit who saw me moving about by using 
footpaths through neighbouring fields and “snickets” between rows of houses. People were 
very happy for me to come visit them in their homes, but some wanted to limit what their 
neighbours could observe and ‘know’ about their private lives. My movements might have 
been of particular interest by local residents given the unusualness of my presence as 
resident anthropologist. But I eventually came to understand that such interest was fully 
contextualised within pre-existing norms and practices of monitoring, tracking and sharing 
information about people, activities and occurrences that forged connections in the locale. 
‘Knowing’ is inextricably bound up in these processes. It is also facilitated by them. ‘Knowing’ 
can indeed mark a sense of belonging to a locale and relatedness, feelings that are perhaps 
heightened in contexts like Dodworth where so much has changed in such a relatively short 
amount of time has occurred: perhaps ‘knowing’ mediates against a sense of disconnection 
and rupture. But, as the example of Ida makes clear, ‘knowing’ is not uniformly a positive 
experience; at times evading the gaze of others into one’s own “business” and attempting to 
limit ‘knowing’ becomes paramount. As such, both ‘knowing’ and notions of belonging 
“challenge the interpretive possibility of limitlessness: the kinds of interests, social or 
personal, that invite extension also truncate it and hybrids that appear able to mix anything 
can serve as boundaries to claims” (Strathern 1996:531). The example from Ida also brings 
into focus the embodied registers over time in experiences of ‘knowing’ and of place that 
are clearly at stake here. Given my emphasis on the more discursive aspects of ‘knowing’, 
such registers are perhaps inadvertently effaced in this account. The work of other authors 
such as Hagerstrand on time geographies (1967) and Seamon in regards to place-ballets 
(1980), both of whom have developed sustained analyses of embodied knowing, are 
instructive contrasts to my own approach in this regard 9. Ida’s experiences could well be 
read with these points in mind, too, although this is admittedly not my focus in this article. 
Talk of ‘knowing’ in Dodworth is not only irreducible from the past, as it is in Bacup 
(Edwards 2000:27), but is also inseparable from talk of transformation and change. In post-
industrial Dodworth, it appeared nearly impossible to speak about place, knowing, or 
belonging without also talking about transformation and change in multiple registers of daily 
life, such as those evidenced by Art above. As the people I came to know reminded me time 
and again, it was not just any old ‘knowing’ they spoke of, but rather a ‘knowing’ that was 
inextricably embedded in a shared experience of rupture between the ‘then’ and the ‘now’. 
‘Knowing’ is thus also a shared shorthand for collective experiences that at times evades 
words, evades recounting, but relies on the having been there together. Having been there, 
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having lived through change and through place (Ingold 2011) together rather than simply ‘in’ 
it, carries an ontological and emotional resonance that often fades out of accounts of social 
transformation but which ‘knowing’ brings back into focus. ‘Knowing’ attests to the deep 
social significance that having been there together, in a prior extended series of shared 
experiences which cross-cut multiple domains of life, holds. These range in the examples 
above from who one worked with, went to school with, neighboured, grew up with, to who 
one’s regular bus driver might have been, but cascade out in many more directions. 
‘Knowing’ thus also relies on temporal depth for its social purchase.  
 
Melancholia, ruination and affect   
 
Up to this point, I have examined the ways in which ‘knowing’ as an idiom and as a set of 
cultural practices reveals the depth of feeling forged between people through place and 
time. The ways in which people and place are mutually possessive (both positively and 
negatively) is brought to the fore via ‘knowing’, especially in regards to absence and erasure 
and incommensurate, merographic domains. In my attention to absent presences, I have 
argued for a focus not on consumption, but in regards to mutual possession, predicated on 
relationships and social memories that are anything but anonymous and whilst forging 
connection can also require containment and limitation. In moving this article to a close, I 
want now to examine one last relevant point of comparison between anthropology and 
human geography. In so doing, I am indebted to Navaro-Yashin’s (2009) rich ethnographic 
account of the dilemmas faced by Turkish-Cypriots living with the objects and in the 
households abandoned by Greek-Cypriots since the partition of Cyprus in 1974. Despite the 
cultural and historical differences represented by her work and my own, this account 
resonates with and sheds light on experiences and discourses in Dodworth, helping me to 
further elaborate an analytical framing of ‘knowing’ by also considering subjectivity, affect 
and loss. Putting forth a model of ‘ruination’, Navaro-Yashin argues powerfully for an 
analysis that accommodates both affect and subjectivity, taking an object- and subject-
centred perspective. She does so in full conversation with the emergence of affect as an 
organising theoretical principle in human geography (Massumi 2002; Clough and Halley 
2009; Thrift 2008), a paradigm that promotes Deleuzian framings of human experience, 
rejecting the analytical primacy of discourse and seeking instead to emphasize pre-linguistic 
and post-subjective domains; in turn, she develops an ethnographically informed 
commentary on such framings (Navaro-Yashin 2009).  
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At partition, and after invasion by the Turkish army, Cyprus was separated into a 
Turkish-Cypriot north and a Greek-Cypriot south. Many thousands of people became 
refugees, forced to leave the part of the island they had always lived in and take up 
residence in their ‘designated’ portion of the island. Many Turkish-Cypriot refugee families 
with whom Navaro-Yashin conducted research have lived since partition in the former 
homes and on the former properties of the previous Greek-Cypriot owners. Stripped of their 
own belongings in the chaos of war and seeking refuge, many Turkish-Cypriots appropriated 
from abandoned Greek-Cypriot households any number of items (personal belongings, 
domestic equipment) to furnish their own new homes. These experiences render present an 
absent ‘enemy community’ via their everyday belongings, homes and fields that were also 
appropriated. That their relations with the absent enemy should be via the goods and spaces 
they have acquired in the aftermath of abandonment and war is a matter of negative ethical 
self-regard for the Turkish-Cypriots Navaro-Yashin came to work with (2009:3).  
It is the subjective emotional experience of living in and being surrounded by 
expropriated objects and properties and the affect “exuded by dwellings, objects and spaces 
left behind by another community after a cataclysmic war” (2009: 4) which Navaro-Yashin 
seeks to analyse. Her research participants often referred to maraz, which she translates as 
melancholia, and attribute it directly to the lack of resolution of the Cyprus conflict. By 
speaking of maraz, they were, she says, “naming the feeling which their environment 
inflicted upon them” (2009:4). This leads Navaro-Yashin in turn to interrogate the 
intersection between subjectivity and affect. As she puts it, “what…is the role of the outer 
environment in engendering subjective feeling?...how are subjective feeling and 
environmentally produced affect intertwined?” (2009:4). The dilemma is whether or not: 
 
affect emerge[s] from the self or from the environment, from subjectivity or 
from the looted objects that have been kept in circulation? Is it Turkish-
Cypriots’ conflicted subjectivity that exudes an affect of melancholia in North 
Cyprus, or is it the rusty and derelict environment kept visibly unmaintained 
since the war that generates this feeling?...Are we to speak of subjectively 
felt or spatially effected melancholia? (2009:5).  
 
Such questions are prompted by Navaro-Yashin’s sense that subjectivity and affect have 
become oppositional principles in contemporary theory. She considers Thrift’s (2008) 
critique of a reliance in cultural theory on texts and discourse in studies of representation 
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and his promotion, in its place, of non-representational theory premised on pre-linguistic 
domains of experience (2009:11-13), developed by Thrift after Deleuze and Guattari, and 
Spinoza before them. Navaro-Yashin tells us that affect, in this approach, refers to emotive 
registers but has been de-coupled from the inner subjective world of the self: “the reference 
point for affect (which used to be, singularly, subjectivity) has been radically altered and 
multiplied in this approach, making it possible to read many other things, such as space and 
the environment, as affective” (2009:12); indeed, affect is “the non-discursive sensation 
which a space or environment generates” (2009:13). To then return to her original question 
about the intersection between subjectivity and affect, she invites us to consider Deleuze 
and Guattari’s theory of spatiality and their contrasting metaphors of the ‘root’ 
(archaeological, grounded, vertical, structure, tracing) and the ‘rhizome’ (multiple, endless 
surface, anti-geneaology, unsitable, creative, potential, in constant movement) with their 
notion of affect as rhizomatic (2009:13).  
Her ethnographic field site, literally a plateau and full of rhizomatic weeds and rusting 
surfaces, is also a land of borders policed by armed soldiers and demarcated by barbed wire 
inhibiting circulation. Furthermore, it is a place where the people she worked with “‘traced’ 
the ruins around them, not just by passing them by, but locating them in time and space” 
(2009:14). Roots versus rhizomes, she finds, are not sufficient to account for the complexity 
of her ethnographic material. She proposes instead the model of the ruin to describe the 
locale within which her contacts lived, neither vertical nor horizontal, but both at the same 
time: “a ruin is rhizomatic in the sense that it grows in uncontrollable and unforeseen 
ways…but a ruin is also about roots, because it is sited as a ‘trace’ of a historical event, it is 
remembered, it is kept, lamented, and cherished in the memory of those who left it behind, 
it is sited…”(2009:14) in time and in place. In the face of this co-existence at work, she says 
that her question about subjectivity and affect is one that cannot be answered with the 
‘either-or’ paradigm so powerfully at work within the literature: “paradigm-setting has cast 
subjectivity against affect, as if one cancels the other and as if one had to choose between 
camps of theoretical approach: a subject-centered or an object-orientated one” (2009:14). 
Navaro-Yashin, finding that neither the people she knows nor the ruin itself “are affective on 
their own or in their own right” but rather “produce and transmit affect relationally” 
(2009:14), ultimately argues for a perspective that reverses a theoretical trend which 
perceives these two positions as antithetical. In attempting to make sense of a research 
locale where affect circulates in non-subjective domains, but where simultaneously the 
subjectivities of the people she worked with “were shaped by and embroiled in the ruins 
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which surrounded them” and melanocholic inner states were spoken of in terms of maraz, 
“the affect of the ruins had a subjective quality, too” (2009:15) and both demand an 
accounting.  
 
Changing times 
 
Dodworth is not Northern Cyprus. The two settings clearly have distinctive historical, 
political and socio-economic specificity. By juxtaposing the two settings, I do not seek to 
draw simple equivalences between them. On the other hand, lessons from Navaro-Yashin’s 
work on affect and subjectivity above resonate with some aspects of life in Dodworth. This is 
most evident in the material that follows in regards to how ‘knowing’ is sustained and 
changed. This is because of a series of overlapping, destabilising shifts in both housing 
tenure and government structures which are held within the context of significant and 
simultaneous post-industrial upheaval. Whilst not living as refugees in a war zone and 
occupying the land, homes and property of the enemy, the people I came to know in 
Dodworth traced absences around them by locating them in relationship to time, other 
people, previous events and current practices. As in Northern Cyprus, an enduring sense of 
loss of what was recently known (technologies, ways of being, forms of comportment, social 
norms) is a permeating affect confronting people in regards to the objects in life and the 
non-human environment (including houses, living spaces and village places) as well as a 
subjectively felt experience, all held together in the idiom of ‘knowing’.   
To illustrate this, I turn to my final ethnographic examples which build on themes of 
access to council houses and “Dodworth for Dodworthers” evident above in Phyllis’s story. 
Their intersection reveals some of the profound changes that are linked to post-industrial 
shifts experienced locally, but that also exceed them in regards to housing and government.  
Henry, in his late 80s, was a Dodworther who had moved to Barnsley after returning 
from the Second World War in order to run a corner store. However, once his children had 
moved out, he and his wife found the family home to be too big for them. So, he went to see 
one of the local Dodworth councillors, 
 
Jack Woffenden, who was a pal from school days; he asked me if I wanted to go 
back to (Dodworth)…so he found me a house. 
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This sort of ‘knowing’ (Henry knowing Jack and Jack knowing him) and the seemingly smooth 
ways in which Dodworth for Dodworthers worked according to need and to ‘knowing’ of 20 
years ago is then contrasted by Henry to his experiences in the present day: 
 
Well, when first I came here you see it was all elderly people in these 
bungalows, all old Dodworthers…But now, gradually over the years there’s…a 
lot who’re not…and therefore they don’t mix the same. What happened was 
if you were well in at the [Barnsley] council you could get one of these 
bungalows…and people come [here to Dodworth] from out of Barnsley 
altogether. It caused a lot of upset because they were built really for 
Dodworth people. 
 
Furthermore, Henry and the man who used to live in the next door bungalow would help 
one another out with errands and by keeping an eye on each other’s homes. When the man 
next door died, Henry was hoping that: 
 
somebody I could get on with would move in next door but [instead] she’s a 
single lady with a few kids…people used to go in and out of one another’s 
houses to help one another but now they couldn’t care less I don’t think; 
there’s that many strangers that’ve moved in…Most of the people aren’t 
belonging to here at all…Well, I don’t know most of the people. Where at 
one time I knew everybody in Dodworth and they knew me. And now 
there’s more people that…know me that I don’t know. I expect they’ve told 
all these different people who I am and how long I’ve been here and that…I 
don’t know them but they know me…Oh, yes, there’s plenty of young fellas 
that call me ‘Henry’ and I think ‘Who the hell are you?’ 
 
In a neat volte-face, Henry eloquently describes how one kind of change in Dodworth has 
dramatically impacted on his sense of entitlement and belonging to the village in which he 
grew up and returned to as a middle-aged man. This change has occurred at the level of 
scale of decision-making about allocation of council housing. Whereas such decisions were 
once made at the immediately local level of government (Dodworth councillors working for 
the Dodworth Council), they are now made by a centralised (and more generalised) Barnsley 
Metropolitan Borough Council. Henry’s sense of the impact of change in scale of governance 
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is evidenced by the ways in which some people are making claims to ‘knowing’ him that he is 
not comfortable with. Indeed, it serves only to heighten his sense of isolation as the 
‘knowing’ is not reciprocal. It is not grounded in a mutual sense of him ‘knowing’ them nor in 
a shared experience of place over time. ‘Knowing’ here is couched in terms of disconnection 
rather than connection. 
The changes Henry describes that are linked to shifts in locus of local governance are 
widely lamented by many of the people I spoke to in Dodworth who considered themselves 
“old Dodworthers”. Crucially, this expression is a claim to belonging through being born and 
bred a Dodworther, rather than a reference to one’s age (although the two generally were 
correlated). Furthermore, change in local governance is just one of many examples people 
would give of why Dodworth is what it no longer used to be. Whilst I have focused here on 
accounts from older people, this sense of permeating and relentless change is described by 
Dodworthers of all ages and on multiple intersecting levels. This is due in part to the post-
industrial rupture of the pit closures. But it also includes shifting forms of sociability 
(knowing and not knowing one’s neighbours), characteristics of living places, the local 
landscape (Art’s tour), technologies in the home and at work. Individually these may be 
small changes, but taken together they add up to a sense of a heavy burden of erasure. The 
significance of ‘knowing’ people and places in post-industrial Dodworth occurs in this 
context. Sharing knowledge and experience of such things (some of them extremely local 
and some of them less so) is to evoke an order of life, a way of being, that is no longer 
existent. To be able to talk about iconic figures (such as Jack Woffenden), strategic practices 
(like how to obtain a council house) and physical former places in the village despite their 
contemporary absence, is also a way in which ‘knowing’ is demonstrated and practiced as it 
draws on a lifetime of local experience. Simultaneously, however, ‘knowing’ is also a framing 
conducted in the register of loss. 
Navaro-Yashin, contemplating the sense of loss and subsequent melancholia that 
her research participants report in Northern Cyprus, states that melancholia is often 
understood in a Freudian sense as “an inner state of personal feeling generated out of loss in 
an inter-subjective relationship”, a framing that recognises relations only between people 
(2009:15). Such a focus purely on the inter-subjective however is unsettled by her account of 
appropriation by those in exile (residing in the former homes of their enemies) of the objects 
and places of their former inhabitants: the locale itself becomes a place where “melancholia 
is mediated through objects and non-human environments” and where “spatial melancholia 
[is palpable]…an environment or atmosphere which discharges” an affect of melancholia, 
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due in this case to the constant presence of appropriated objects that promote a sense of a 
lost purity of self and the loss of moral integrity within the new owners (2009:16). Once 
again, Navaro-Yashin’s analysis clearly deposits us in a paradigmatic realm that cannot be 
exclusively concerned with affect or subjectivity, exteriority or interiority, but both 
simultaneously, a point she argues for eloquently. As the example of Henry attests to, 
‘knowing’ in Dodworth is also bound up in similar contours. ‘Knowing’ concerns not only the 
domain of the inter-personal, but is contextualised and takes new shape in context of 
historically contingent shifts that concertina change across domains of people, place, objects 
and technologies. As with melancholia in Northern Cyprus, ‘knowing’ in Dodworth attests to 
the intersection of internal and external worlds whereby absence and presence, people and 
place produce affect in a series of relations; subjective experience and affect produced by 
place radically transformed across multiple levels are simultaneously at work.  
 
Conclusions 
 
‘Knowing’, used regularly in everyday speech to refer to people and place, is an idiom and a 
set of cultural practices. I have argued here that paying critical attention to the ways in 
which ‘knowing’ is put to work socially and culturally permits fruitful insight into multiple 
overlapping relations. These relations are understood to be central to the ways in which 
people become made meaningful and become connected to the world they live in. Such 
processes are not simply subjective, but are enmeshed in the domains of place and of things. 
They are also historically contingent, tied to socio-economic transformation, shifts in forms 
of sociability, changes in housing tenure and in government infrastructures. In these ways, 
critical analytical attention to a seemingly banal idiom of ‘knowing’ and the cultural practices 
associated with it in a seemingly unspectacular research locale actually contribute to a 
rethinking of conceptions of place. This rethinking is based on an examination of the 
intersections of affect and subjectivity, grounded in everyday experiences of profound social 
transformation and the intersection of place and absent presences. 
‘Knowing’ encompasses multiple domains which at first glance appear contradictory 
and perhaps nonsensical. These crossings range from demolished industrial sites, to senses 
of belonging, to kinship networks, to people deceased; from local sites erased, to personal 
domiciles and to individual biographies. However, anthropological perspectives on 
merographic connections, and particularly those put forward by Strathern, illuminate the 
cultural logic at work that permits such domain crossings evident in ‘knowing’. Connections 
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caught up in ‘knowing’ in Dodworth as in Bacup (Edwards 2000) and Corsica (Candea 2010) 
are not simply connections between people. They are, rather, connections that insist on 
binding people, places, memories and pasts together in terms of ‘what matters’.  
Furthermore, these connections regularly shuttle quite comfortably between 
different temporal frames and eras which may also appear initially incommensurate. Indeed, 
I have argued that it is the accumulation of experiences over time that matters in the ways 
in which people and place become mutually possessive. And yet, whilst ‘knowing’ occurs in a 
temporally rich framework, it is one that can work to exclude as much as connect. Thus, the 
processes of ‘knowing’ can also be ones that individuals at times exert concerted efforts to 
evade, ducking the piercing scrutiny and local circulation of ‘news’ and information that 
‘knowing’ is built upon. 
It is precisely this intense documentation of the most minute details of individual’s 
biographies, of the webs of relations that connect them and of shared local experiences 
(contested as those details may be) that attest in turn to the ways in which considerations of 
absence demand a more elaborated approach in our accounts of place and experience. 
Absence and its significance is not only linked to processes of consumption and disposal, but 
is also pertinent to connections between people and place, used as it is to navigate the 
relations between them. Furthermore, unlike the ghosts of industrial ruins that Edensor 
writes so evocatively about, the absences traced through ‘knowing’ in Dodworth are 
anything but anonymous. Absent people and places erased are rendered present and 
socially relevant through practices of ‘knowing’. ‘Knowing’ thus concertinas both temporal 
eras and various conceptual domains: relationships, locales, encounters and attachments of 
people and places (both present and absent) in the current day and in the past are necessary 
points of reference in everyday conversation, practices which also establish and reaffirm (for 
some) a sense of belonging. Indeed, it is the emotional register of the connections and 
disconnections that ‘knowing’ indexes which is a salient characteristic further highlighting its 
significance for lived human experiences. 
Finally, I have considered my material from Dodworth in light of a distinctly different 
ethnographic setting, namely Navaro-Yashin’s work in Northern Cyprus (2009). Drawing 
inspiration from Navaro-Yashin’s own analysis, I have argued that an enduring sense of loss 
in Dodworth demands an accounting for both the external/object and internal/subject 
dimensions of events. This is because the sense of loss that ‘knowing’ indexes is lodged in 
profoundly transformed environments (like those evoked by Art) as well as in social 
processes such as ruptured forms of sociability and strategic practices (as described by 
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Henry). It is the co-presence of this sense of loss not only in the realm of the inter-subjective 
but also in the locale itself where “the effects of capitalism and modernization pile up on the 
landscape as the detritus of history” (Stewart 1996: 4) in the ruined and transformed non-
human environment that demand an accounting not possible by favouring affect over 
subjective, or vice versa. Ultimately, by paying close attention to the complexities of 
‘knowing’ rather than dismissing it as simply banal figure of speech, we become attuned to 
the multiple overlapping registers that intertwine people, place, presence and absence. The 
merographic connections that ‘knowing’ brings to light demonstrate the profundity of these 
processes for how people and place become meaningful and become connected to the 
world that they constitute, together. 
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Notes 
1 A national supermarket chain. 
2 A national chain of stores selling bicycles and car parts. 
3 A high percentage of people I interviewed formally or informally were born in Dodworth 
(fifty-eight percent) and only two percent were born in Yorkshire but outside the Barnsley 
area and five percent were born outside Yorkshire altogether. As such, there is a great deal 
of collective experience that can be and is drawn upon by many of my research participants. 
While not true for everyone living in Dodworth today, a significant group has grown up and 
is growing old together. See Degnen 2012 for a more detailed account of this dynamic.  
4 The first was on the experiences of ageing and the second was on public understandings of 
genetically modified food. As is not unusual in long-term ethnographic fieldwork, ‘knowing’ 
was a topic that I did not set out to study but which emerged across these two periods of 
research. Over time I came to realise that it was of central concern and interest to the 
people I was working with and as such demanded analytic consideration. It was not however 
until recently when I began reading the relevant human geography literature, in conjunction 
with current anthropological work, that I could articulate the arguments and analysis that I 
put forward here. 
5 In Degnen 2012, I present a fully detailed ethnographic description of this locale which in 
an article of this length is not feasible to cover in more depth. 
6 Home helps are workers paid for privately or by the council to assist older people living 
independently in their own homes with tasks such as dressing, bathing, or cooking. 
7 Bacup is about 40 miles northwest of Dodworth. 
8 For more on such social networks in a similar cultural setting to Dodworth see Strangleman 
2001. 
9 My thanks to an anonymous reviewer of this article for suggesting this point. 
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